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THE BRIEF DEMISE OF REMITTITUR:
THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN SHAPING
REMEDIES LAW
Sarah M. R. Cravens*
Among the underrated remedies decisions discussed in this Symposium,
there is a particular episode in Missouri that highlights the tension
between the judiciary and the legislature in shaping remedies law. In
two 1985 companion cases, the Missouri Supreme Court eliminated
remittitur as a common law remedy in the state, finding inconsistency
and abuse in the doctrine's application by trial judges. Just two years
later, however, the Missouri legislature reinstated remittitur as a
remedy by statute-without addressing any of the concerns raised by
the state's supreme court. Given the criticism of the court's action as
unwarranted activism, the legislature's failure to address the court's
reasoning is particularly ironic since the court was actively limiting its
own authority. In analyzing the arguments of the Missouri Supreme
Court against remittitur and the legislature's failure to address them,
this Article attempts to highlight some of the tensions between the
legislative and judicial branches inherent to the creation of judicial
procedure, as well as to shed light on this previously overlooked
episode in remedies law.
One of the questions posed for the 2007 Remedies Discussion
Forum sought opinions deserving of the title of "most underrated
remedies decision." In response, this Article proposes for that
distinction a decision (expressed in each of two companion cases)
that did not have a lasting effect but is noteworthy for that very point.
In 1985, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to abolish remittitur in
Firestone v. Crown Center Redevelopment Corp.' and, in its
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. My thanks to the
participants in the 2007 Remedies Discussion Forum and to Mary Caroline Cravens, Will
Cravens, Stewart Moritz, and Tracy Thomas for helpful comments and questions.
1. 693 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), superseded by statute, MO. REV. STAT. § 537.068
(2008).
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companion case, Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp.2  Thus, for
approximately twenty-four months, the option of remittitur did not
exist in the state of Missouri.' The court's decision to abolish
remittitur in Firestone and Kenton was an underrated one even
though-indeed because-it was quickly reversed by the Missouri
legislature with no apparent regard for the reasoning expressed by
the court.4  The whole episode failed to provoke any serious
discussion of the ramifications or implications for the judicial role in
shaping remedies jurisprudence. Nor did it provoke discussion over
the proper relationship between the judiciary and the legislature on
either substantive or procedural issues in the field of remedies.
This Article suggests that these judicial opinions and the
subsequent legislative response were quite significant and thus are
worthy of further attention and discussion. To begin with, the court
eliminated a remedial tool that had long been within a judge's
discretion, citing the failure of lower court judges to use that tool
properly.5 In so doing, the court reasoned in practical terms about
how judges make certain remedial determinations and wrote (perhaps
surprisingly) candidly about the problems facing judges who must
make those remedial determinations without sufficient guidance.6
The relatively swift legislative response to the court's dramatic but
mindful move shows, by contrast, a certain disregard for the judicial
perspective and for the specific concerns advanced by those with
everyday experience in the implementation of this remedial option.
It provides a striking example of underappreciation for a valuable
resource of knowledge and practical experience in the application of
remedies law.
The court's dramatic step, however short-lived in its practical
effect, says a great deal about the important role judges might (and
2. 693 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). Firestone and Kenton were decided on the same
day, arose out of the same factual event, and had the common issue of the propriety of remittitur.
However, as a technical matter, the original decision of the Missouri Supreme Court to abolish
the doctrine of remittitur occurred in the Firestone case and was then followed as precedent (with
what the court saw as further justification) in the Kenton case. See id. at 86 (acknowledging the
principles set forth in Firestone and reversing the trial court's decision to grant remittitur based
on those principles).
3. Firestone was decided on June 25, 1985, and the Missouri legislature enacted its
remittitur statute effective July 1, 1987. See 693 S.W.2d at 110.
4. See § 537.068.
5. See Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110.
6. See id.
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arguably should) play in assessing and determining their own
capacity for remedial decisionmaking. The legislative response to
these cases, in turn, shows the tension between the judiciary and the
legislature in the area of rulemaking authority.7 Firestone and
Kenton demonstrate the potential pitfalls of remittitur in a way that
reveals the doctrine as fundamentally judicial. Properly considered,
the decisions may be used to raise the general awareness of the role
the judiciary can, and perhaps should, play in shaping both the
jurisprudence and the day-to-day practice of remedial
decisionmaking.
What follows is divided into three parts. The first section
provides a brief examination of remittitur to put the doctrine in its
proper context for the discussion that follows. The second section
describes and explains the Firestone and Kenton cases, emphasizing
the importance of the court's reasoning behind the elimination of
remittitur. The third section suggests that this episode can offer
insight into the jurisprudence of remedies and explains why the
decisions still deserve attention after being largely ignored for so
many years.
I. THE REMITTITUR OPTION
It is, of course, possible to overstate the importance of remittitur.
In formal terms, remittitur is merely an option for a party to a lawsuit
to consider.8 The party may choose to take a reduction in damages or
opt for a new trial.' Remittitur is not a binding or authoritative
change in the amount of damages to be crammed down the parties'
throats.'" Furthermore, if the judge believes a jury's award of
damages is truly erroneous, she can simply grant a motion for a new
trial unconditionally." Thus, in theory, remittitur is arguably not of
crucial importance. In practice, however, it is potentially a very
powerful tool for a judge to have at her disposal. It is one of many
7. The fuzzy distinction between laws of substance and procedure where remittitur is
concerned, which gives rise to particular tension here, is discussed further below. See infra Part
III.
8. See 66 C.J.S. New Trial § 271 (2008).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. In Missouri, as the Firestone court points out, this was already, and remains, a
straightforward matter of statutory law. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110 (citing Mo. SUP. CT. R.
78.01-.02); see also, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 59.
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means by which a judge can exert a strong influence without
definitively or dispositively imposing her authority. In practice,
remittitur effectively eliminates the likelihood that a new trial will
actually go forward.' 2  In issuing a remittitur, a judge effectively
redetermines, in final form, the amount of damages that a plaintiff
will receive. Whether and how such power will be implemented
necessarily implicates issues of judicial ethics and practical
judgment.
There is not tremendous consistency in the versions of remittitur
employed in various state court systems across the country. In some
states it is embodied in a rule of civil procedure 3 or in legislation
similar to that of Missouri. 4 In other states it remains a matter of
common law. 5 Some courts find authority in more than one of these
sources. For example, a court may simultaneously state that the
authority for remittitur is implicit in the state's version of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and that the authority is a longstanding
matter of inherent judicial power. 6 While wording of the standards
may vary, the decision whether to grant a remittitur is generally
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 7 Many courts,
working with the same lack of specificity or guidance found in the
Missouri statute, simply look to the standard of "excessiveness" of
the verdict. 8  However, in some jurisdictions, that idea of
"excessiveness" is filled out with a more specific standard of proof 9
12. Suja A. Thomas, Re-examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh
Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 739-46 (2003) (demonstrating the illusory nature of the
alternative "option" of remittitur for plaintiffs). The scholarly interest in remittitur has largely
been limited to the issue of whether it violates the jury trial right. The Missouri Supreme Court
did not attack the doctrine on this basis. In fact, prior Missouri case law had raised that issue and
concluded that remittitur did not violate the jury trial right. See, e.g., Counts v. Thompson, 222
S.W.2d 487, 495 (Mo. 1949). It is the fact that the court attacked remittitur on entirely pragmatic
rather than theoretical grounds that makes these cases so noteworthy.
13. See, e.g., IDAHOR. Civ. P. 59.1.
14. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.74 (West 1986).
15. See, e.g., Banegura v. Taylor, 541 A.2d 969, 976 (Md. 1988).
16. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Looper, 732 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Ark. 1987) (implicit in ARK. R.
Civ. P. 59); S. & C. Transp. Co. v. Barnes, 85 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Ark. 1935) (matter of inherent
authority).
17. See, e.g., Hash v. Hogan, 453 P.2d 468, 472 (Alaska 1969); Boynton v. Figueroa, 913
A.2d 697, 709 (N.H. 2006).
18. See, e.g., Hash, 453 P.2d at 472; Shepherd, 732 S.W.2d at 151; Banegura, 541 A.2d at
976.
19. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-12 (2008) (stating specifically a preponderance of
evidence standard).
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or a list of factors to help define "adequacy" or "excessiveness" of
the amount.2" Some versions make review of the amount of a
judgment a matter appropriate for sua sponte consideration by the
judge.2' Others allow review upon motion by one of the parties.22
These examples provide only a small sampling of the wide-ranging
variety in the scope and logistics of remittitur in the state courts.
This sampling is, however, sufficient to demonstrate the absence of
any uniform workable version of the doctrine that would
conclusively answer the concerns expressed by the Missouri court.
In any of these permutations, remittitur is fundamentally a
judicially focused doctrine. Its implementation is a matter of judicial
"sense"-a tool for fairness, discretion, situation sense, and practical
wisdom. A judge consults her conscience and considers whether it
is, for example, "shocked" by the amount of damages awarded by a
jury. It is not only a matter of judgment, but one that will necessarily
be unique to each case.23  As such, it is a doctrine that implicates
matters of practical judicial ethics, broadly defined, insofar as judges
will be guided by an internal compass of right and wrong, both as to
the substance of the issue before them and as to the level of
involvement appropriate to their judicial role.
Remittitur has faced criticism before. It has somewhat shaky
roots in the common law of England, for example, 24  but is
nonetheless widely considered a legitimate common law doctrine in
the United States.25 Beyond its pedigree, there have been more
current challenges focusing on its constitutional legitimacy. Most
commonly, the argument is that remittitur interferes with the Seventh
Amendment guarantee against reexamination of facts determined by
20. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.74(5)(a)-(e) (West 1986).
21. In Connecticut, "[i]f the court at the conclusion of the trial concludes that the verdict is
excessive as a matter of law, it shall order a remittitur and, upon failure of the party so ordered to
remit the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial. If the
court concludes that the verdict is inadequate as a matter of law, it shall order an additur, and
upon failure of the party so ordered to add the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the
verdict and order a new trial." CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-216a (West 2008).
22. See, e.g., ME. R. CIV. P. 59(a).
23. See Firestone v. Crown Ctr. Redev. Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 108 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)
("[T]here is no precise formula for determining whether a verdict is excessive; each case has been
considered on its own facts."), superseded by statute, MO. REV. STAT. § 537.068 (2008).
24. There are questions about whether remittitur existed in the English corpus as of 1791.
See Thomas, supra note 12, at 747.
25. See Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English
Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 696-97 (2004).
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juries.2 However, neither the common law pedigree nor the
constitutionality of remittitur played a major role in the abolishment
of the doctrine in Missouri. Rather, the Missouri Supreme Court
abolished the doctrine as a matter of practical judicial concern.27
II. THE CASES AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
A. The Cases: Firestone and Kenton
Both Firestone and Kenton arose out of the tragic skywalk
collapse at the Kansas City Hyatt Regency hotel on July 17, 1981, in
which 114 people died and many more were injured.28 The jury in
Firestone reached a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded $15 million
in compensatory damages. 29  The defendants sought a new trial,
attacking the verdict as excessive.3" The defendants made no claim
of misconduct by counsel or the court in attacking the verdict. There
was no claim of passion or prejudice of the jury.31 Instead, the
defendants simply attacked the amount of the jury's award as
erroneous as a matter of fact. As a result of this defense motion, the
trial court remitted the damages to $12.75 million as a condition to
denial of a new trial to defendants (a reduction of 15 percent).32 Both
sides appealed the remittitur order.33 The defendants sought a further
reduction to $7.5 million (for a net 50 percent reduction in the jury
verdict).34 The plaintiffs sought a restoration of the remitted $2.25
26. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Thomas, supra note 12, at 751. When, for the bulk
of the second half of the twentieth century, the Oregon Supreme Court maintained that there was
no remittitur power invested in its state courts, that too was decided as a matter of interpretation
of the state constitution, rather than any practical concern with the functioning of the doctrine.
See Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 210 P.2d 461, 472 (Or. 1949) (interpreting 1910 amendment to
article VII, section 3 of Oregon Constitution); see also Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,
418 (1994) (requiring allowance ofjudicial review of the amount of punitive damages awarded as
a matter of due process).
27. Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (following
Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110).
28. Id. at 85; Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 101.
29. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 101.
30. Id. at 108.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 101.
34. Id.
THE BRIEF DEMISE OF REMITTITUR
million.35 The Supreme Court of Missouri, sitting en banc, reinstated
the original jury verdict of $15 million and abolished the doctrine of
remittitur.36 This latter ruling is the primary matter of concern to
which we shall return momentarily.
In Kenton, a rising third-year law student sued the Hyatt Hotels
Corporation, along with other defendants, for injuries she suffered in
the same incident." The defendants had stipulated to liability and the
parties had agreed to try only the issue of compensatory damages.38
The jury awarded Ms. Kenton a total of $4 million in compensatory
damages.39 In response to a post-trial motion by defendants, the trial
judge issued a remittitur of $250,000 as a condition to avoid a new
trial.4' This represented a reduction of the jury's verdict by only 6.25
percent. There is no indication of how the trial court arrived at this
precise figure. Even if the trial court had credited all of the
plaintiff's highest estimates on various elements of damages, the
total damages would have been only roughly $3.2 million.4' Thus,
the trial court's determination that the appropriate amount of
damages was $3.75 million as opposed to $4 million is puzzling.42
Just as in Firestone, both sides appealed the order.43 The court of
appeals affirmed the judgment but transferred the case to the state's
high court for further consideration.44 Before the Missouri Supreme
Court, the defendants argued that any amount of compensatory
35. Id. Although an order granting a remittitur as a means of avoiding a new trial is
typically not considered a final appealable order, Missouri Rule of Appellate Procedure 78.10
permits a plaintiff to go ahead and remit the damages as ordered, in order to avoid going through
with a new trial and then file a cross-appeal challenging the remittitur order when and if the
losing party appeals.
36. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110.
37. See Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
38. The parties in an entire group of cases had stipulated that punitive damages would be
allocated, subject to an aggregate cap, in proportion to the amount of compensatories awarded.
Id. at 95. By removing liability issues from the arguments to be made before the jury, the
defendants presumably sought to avoid the presentation of evidence that might impassion the jury
to reach a higher damages amount.
39. Id. at 85.
40. Id. at 98.
41. Id. at 97.
42. Id. (noting plaintiff's evidence provided a range between $2.3 million and $3.2 million
in compensatories).
43. Id. at 86.
44. Id. Under state law, this transfer led to the Missouri Supreme Court taking the case as an
original appeal. MO. CONST. art. V, § 10.
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damages above $2 million would shock the conscience. 45  The
plaintiff argued that the original amount determined by the jury
should be reinstated.46  The court ruled for the plaintiff on
reinstatement of the full jury verdict and then went further,
referencing its decision in Firestone and making additional
arguments in support of its determination that remittitur would
thereafter be abolished in the state of Missouri.47
In considering the basic standard for reviewing a claim of excess
in Firestone, the court noted: "[T]here is no precise formula for
determining whether a verdict is excessive; each case has been
considered on its own facts. . . . '[t]he ultimate test is what fairly and
reasonably compensates plaintiff for the injuries sustained.' 48  The
defense's vague allegation of error did not impress the court, which
noted that the jury in Firestone had heard conflicting expert
testimony and that ultimately "[t]he jury is vested with a broad
discretion in fixing fair and reasonable compensation to an injured
party, and the [evidence of plaintiffs injuries presented in the instant
case] substantiates the jury's award. '49  On this record, the court
found that there was no justification for the trial court judge to have
exercised the discretion to remit any portion of the damages."
Having found no justification for any amount of remittitur in
Firestone, the court considered, entirely sua sponte, the more general
problems of remittitur, apparently finding this case to show that
problem in particular relief. The problems in the application of the
doctrine had been noted in prior instances by the state appellate
courts.5 The Missouri Supreme Court itself had questioned the
doctrine a little over a decade earlier, determining at that time that
the case before it was not the proper vehicle for full-scale
45. See Kenton, 693 S.W.2d at 97. Other than the fact that it represents half of the jury's
verdict, it is unclear what this figure was based on. It is also perhaps noteworthy, in considering
this proposed amount, that what would in the defendant's assertion "shock the conscience" would
be lower than the bottom end of the plaintiff's suggested range of damages. See id.
46. Id. at 86.
47. Id.
48. Firestone v. Crown Ctr. Redev. Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 108 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)
(citations omitted), superseded by statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.068 (2008).
49. Id. at 109-10 (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 110.
51. See Worley v. Tucker Nevils, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 417, 423 (Mo. 1973) (citing court of
appeals opinion below, which in turn cites a previous court of appeals opinion in Effinger v. Bank
of St. Louis, 467 S.W.2d 291, 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971)).
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consideration of a change of approach to remittitur doctrine. 2
Noting that there was no authority for the doctrine other than the
precedent of past practice in the state, and citing the specific example
of the companion case Kenton, the court in Firestone pointed to the
"confusion and inconsistency" that have plagued the application of
the doctrine. 3 The court acknowledged the "worthy purpose" of the
doctrine ("bringing uniformity to verdicts and judgments for
unliquidated damages"), but found that the inconsistencies in
application to particular cases had undermined that purpose. 4 The
court found especial fault with the fact that remittitur could not
effectively serve the purpose of judicial economy as long as the
remittitur itself was subject to appeal.55 The court found adequate
protection for litigants and adequate means of judicial control of jury
verdicts in the state rules permitting outright (rather than conditional)
grants of new trials. 6 On that reasoning, the court concluded,
broadly and absolutely, "that remittitur shall no longer be employed
in Missouri."57
In Firestone, the problem of remittitur was thus the fault of the
doctrine itself. the standard was too confusing and imprecise to be
applied consistently and was therefore ineffective at serving its
supposed purpose." The arguments presented for abolishing
remittitur in the Kenton case are somewhat different, and arguably
more powerful, but much more briefly stated. Like the defendants in
Firestone, the defendants in Kenton complained on appeal that the
52. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110 (citing Worley, 503 S.W.2d at 424, 428). In Worley,
concurring and dissenting judges emphasized that the case before them was inappropriate for a
wholesale reconsideration of remittitur. Worley, 503 S.W.2d at 424, 428 (Donnely, C.J.,
concurring; Bardgett, Seiler & Morgan, JJ., dissenting). The majority opinion in Worley is
interesting background for Firestone and Kenton, though, as it details a disagreement with the
court of appeals about the propriety of appellate review of remittitur orders. As of 1973, as the
majority opinion demonstrates, it was the court of appeals that questioned the workings of
remittitur, and the supreme court that insisted on its legitimacy. See id. at 423 (majority opinion).
53. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110.
54. Id.
55. Id. Of course, there is also a point to be made about the potential ineffectiveness of a
remittitur ruling in the fact that if the new trial option is taken, there is no carryover effect of the
remittitur ruling, so that the new trial might easily result in another excessive verdict, requiring
(in theory) yet another new trial.
56. Id. (citing Mo. SUP. CT. R. 78.01-02).
57. Id. One judge dissented, but did not write to express whether the basis of that dissent
was related to the abolishment of remittitur. Id. (Welliver, J., dissenting).
58. See id.
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amount remitted was insufficient to correct the original verdict. 9 In
Kenton, however, the defendants gave slightly more definition to the
basis for their allegation of error. According to the opinion, the
defendants argued that:
[A]s a matter of law the jury's verdict greatly exceeded the
upper limits of "fair and reasonable compensation," the
proper measure of damages, and that the verdict was, as the
trial court itself recognized, the erroneous product of a
mistaken evaluation of highly incendiary evidence and
[was] improperly disproportionate to awards for
comparable or more severe injuries.6"
The Missouri Supreme Court, reviewing this allegation, noted
particularly the jury's discretion in the first instance to assess the
damages, and its "far better position" to determine fair and
reasonable compensation for the plaintiffs damages.6  The court
noted the wide "range between the damage extremes of inadequacy
and excessiveness" within which the jury has "virtually unfettered
discretion" and need not specify the allocation of amounts for
particular elements.62
Having thus emphasized the discretion peculiar to the jury in
such cases, the court looked to the standard to be employed by the
trial judge in reviewing the jury's verdict in the first instance and
found that "[t]here is no exact formula to determine whether a
verdict is excessive; each case is considered on its own facts. The
ultimate test is what fairly and reasonably compensates plaintiff for
the injuries sustained."63 The supreme court found that the trial court
abused its discretion in the Kenton case by remitting a "miniscule
percentage" of the total verdict, referring to this exercise of
discretion as "judicial hairsplitting."'  The supreme court explained
that the trial court's action was only one example of "the extremes to
59. Each apparently thought a more reasonable amount would be half of the original jury
verdict rendered against it, although those two amounts are quite far apart: $2 million for Ms.
Kenton and $7.5 million for Ms. Firestone. Id. at 101; Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d
83, 86 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
60. Kenton, 693 S.W.2d at 97.
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 98 (quoting Chrisler v. Holiday Valley, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979)).
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. Id.
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THE BRIEF DEMISE OF REMITTITUR
which the remittitur practice has fallen," and, in accordance with the
holding of Firestone, held that the order of remittitur in the case had
to be set aside.65 The supreme court incorporated by reference the
arguments about remittitur made in Firestone as "equally applicable
here."66
Thus, the reasoning expressed in support of the Kenton decision
does not seem to be based as much on the fault of the doctrine as in
Firestone. Instead, the reasoning in Kenton seems to be based on the
fault of the judges who are applying remittitur as a means of
tinkering with jury verdicts, rather than correcting gross errors. In
the view of the Missouri Supreme Court, in cases like Kenton (and it
is important that the court does not see that case as unique in
presenting this particular problem) trial judges had been abusing the
remittitur doctrine by simply substituting their own assessments of
the proper amount of damages for those of the juries, without
confining themselves to the correction of extremes.67
In both opinions, the court notes the problematic lack of a
precise formula for assessing or reviewing damage amounts.68 Thus,
the court underscores the extent to which this decisionmaking
function of the judicial role is fundamentally committed to judicial
"sense" or "judgment" particular to the facts of any given case.69 As
with other matters of judicial discretion, the use of remittitur and the
determination of the proper amount to be remitted calls for a certain
element of judicial art or craft-what Karl Llewellyn referred to as
"situation sense"7 or what Aristotle referred to as "practical
wisdom."'" When the highest court of the state throws up its hands
and declares that such a fundamentally judicially driven doctrine has
been so misapplied or is so incapable of consistent application that it
65. Id.
66. Id. It is interesting that the court chose to make Firestone the precedential case on this
issue, since the reasoning concerning abuse in Kenton seems more compelling. Perhaps this was
deliberately done to avoid the focus on abuse of discretion and instead to fault the doctrine itself
as a matter of public relations, but it is unclear from the text of the opinions. At any rate, this is
just another question that makes these opinions worthy of further attention.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 95; see also Firestone v. Crown Ctr. Redev. Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 108 (Mo.
1985) (en banc), superseded by statute, MO. REV. STAT. § 537.068 (2008).
69. See Kenton, 693 S.W.2d at 95; see also Firestone 693 S.W.2d at 108.
70. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 121 (1960).
71. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. VI, ch. 5, at 1140a24-30 (Joe Sachs trans.,
Focus Publ'g 2002).
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must be removed from the array of a judge's tools, it is necessarily a
matter of tremendous significance. Such a decision is of great
significance because it reflects on both the role of the judge and the
doctrine of remittitur itself.
While the court's rulings in these two cases stood, judges were
required to limit their grants of new trials on damages issues to those
in which juries had truly gone beyond the bounds of reason.7 2 In
those cases, rather than substituting their own judgments as to more
accurate amounts of damages for those of juries, judges would
simply grant requests for new trials unconditionally.73 Under such a
regime, judges would have to think in more black and white terms.
Indeed, they would have to return to a truer meaning of the phrase
"shocks the conscience."
B. The Legislative Response: A New Statute
Firestone and Kenton would be noteworthy remedies opinions
even without any further chapters in the story. However, the
response of the state legislature makes them even more interesting as
a matter of remedies jurisprudence and judicial ethics theory, and
makes it even more surprising that these cases have garnered so little
attention. On January 6, 1987, the Final Report of the Missouri Task
Force on Liability Insurance suggested to the Missouri General
Assembly that remittitur should be reinstated (and additur
established) by statute, for the dual purposes of achieving equitable
compensation and avoiding the need to retry cases.74 Effective July
1, 1987, the Missouri legislature put remittitur back into state law by
statute. 75  The statute, which relates specifically to "Torts and
Actions for Damages, 76 provides (in pertinent part) that: "A court
72. See Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110.
73. See id.
74. Bishop v. Cummines, 870 S.W.2d 922, 924 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (citing THE MO.
TASK FORCE ON LIAB. INS., FINAL REPORT 25 (1987)).
75. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.068 (2008). One might stop to wonder about the lobbying forces
that may have prompted the legislature to reinstate this doctrine: whether the impetus came from
some specific interest group, whether the legislation was fought by another interest group, and so
on. However, the answers to those questions are irrelevant to the discussion here. Whatever the
impetus, it is not the forces behind the reestablishment of remittitur but the fact of that
reestablishment-the manner and content of this move by the legislature-that matters for the
purposes of this Article.
76. Id. This would thus clearly apply to later cases along the same lines as Kenton and
Firestone.
[Vol. 42:247
THE BRIEF DEMISE OF REMITTITUR
may enter a remittitur order if, after reviewing the evidence in
support of the jury's verdict, the court finds that the jury's verdict is
excessive because the amount of the verdict exceeds fair and
reasonable compensation for plaintiff's injuries and damages."7
What makes this development so noteworthy is not just that the
legislature reversed the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court-
that is not so unusual a sequence of events-but that in doing so the
lawmakers failed to address any of the concerns expressed by the
judiciary. It is the judiciary that has the practical experience with
implementation of the common law doctrine, the constitutional
authority to develop rules and procedures for the courts and to
oversee the discipline of judges, and now the responsibility to
implement the statute the legislature enacted. All of these factors
counsel in favor of giving adequate credence and even deference to
the input of the leaders of the judiciary in order to address their
practical concerns. Furthermore, there is surely enough concern
already about judicial overreaching and activism without adding
more areas in which judges will be asked to substitute their judgment
for that of a fact-finding jury, heedless of judicial disinclination to do
so. By not only reinstating remittitur but also establishing additur,
the legislature achieved a net increase in judicial discretion where
the judiciary perceived abuse of that discretion.
The legislature provided no detailed statutory language to
address the state supreme court's specific concerns about the
ambiguity of the remittitur standard or the need to cabin judicial
discretion more effectively." If anything, the legislature provided
less guidance than had been available previously. The statute does
not even incorporate, for example, any list of considerations the
courts had previously used as a matter of common law for assessing
the propriety of damages amounts.79 Nor does the statute incorporate
77. Id. The statute goes on to codify the remedy of additur with the mirror image of the
standard for remittitur,
78. Id.
79. See Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). No doubt
courts might still consider those factors, but the legislature seems to have taken no trouble to
consider the factors (or the concerns expressed by the Missouri Supreme Court about ambiguity
and inconsistency). Furthermore, the legislature has failed to assure judges that these factors
were proper or relevant for the statutory doctrine they intended to enact.
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the standards, such as "shocking the judicial conscience," which had
previously appeared in some common law analyses.8"
Explicit incorporation of such standards might in some small
way have dealt with the particular concern the court showed in
Kenton about restricting the use of remittitur to correct extremes
rather than to permit tinkering with jury verdict amounts.8' A jury
verdict might very easily exceed "fair and reasonable" compensation
by a small percentage in the view of a trial court. The standard in the
statute thus seems to invite the very same possibility of mere
substitution of judgment by the trial court that was such a concern to
the court in Kenton.82 Finally, in terms of the lack of guidance from
the legislature, there is no indication of a standard of proof to be
used.83 It is one thing to ask how far the amount of damages has to
be from what the judge would have considered to be accurate or even
within a range of reasonableness. It is another to ask whether that
difference must be proven to the judge by a preponderance of the
evidence, by clear and convincing evidence, or by some other
standard. Without improvements in the specificity of guidance and
without additional fetters on the discretion of the lower court judges,
there is nothing in the legislative response to address the very
problems that led the Missouri Supreme Court to announce that the
doctrine was not properly achieving its purposes.
The purposes of remittitur that were announced to the General
Assembly in the task force report were those of promoting judicial
economy and achieving equitable compensation (correcting jury
awards that are "unfair" or "unreasonable").84 Given that the leaders
of the state judiciary had determined that the mechanism of remittitur
was too imprecise and prone to confusion, inconsistency, and even
abuse by their fellow judges, the legislature might have done better
to find an entirely different mechanism to achieve its goals.
80. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Cash Register Serv. Co., 518 S.W.2d 736, 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
81. The Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri has indicated, though, that
rules of interpretation and application from before the abrogation of the doctrine are still helpful
in interpreting the new statute. See Bishop v. Cummines, 870 S.W.2d 922, 924 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994). This may be useful in supporting the use of other interpretive phrases, but it does nothing
constructive to solve the problems the Missouri Supreme Court found with consistent application
of the rule as it stood before 1985.
82. See Kenton, 693 S.W.2d at 98.
83. See § 537.068.
84. Bishop, 870 S.W.2d at 924 n.3 (citing THE Mo. TASK FORCE ON LIAB. INS., supra note
74, at 25).
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Even if the legislature determined that remittitur was still the
best possible mechanism, it should have directly addressed the
difficulties observed by those who make these decisions regularly in
practice, at least by providing greater clarity or precision. If the
legislature believed there was a problem with excessive jury verdicts
that called for a remedy short of unconditionally granting a new trial,
and if they believed that the intermediate remedy was so
straightforward as not to require more specific guidance, perhaps
they might have taken a different approach entirely. Perhaps they
might have acted more clearly within their own province, for
example, by setting statutory caps based on specific criteria. At a
bare minimum, the legislature might have made a gesture at
establishing specific criteria for judges to use in reaching case-by-
case determinations on remittitur orders, rather than simply
reinstating the doctrine without addressing the problems identified by
the leaders of the state's judicial branch.
The statutory language is, of course, permissive, not mandatory:
"A court may enter a remittitur order."85  Thus, even under the
statutory regime, it is arguable that judges might simply exercise
their discretion never to use remittitur. But this arrangement fails to
address the problem of lower court abuse noted in Kenton.86 After
all, remittitur was never mandatory under the common law scheme
either, and yet the problem of abuse existed.87 Furthermore, as long
as remittitur is present in the statute, unhappy litigants will continue
to make arguments to trial judges about why they should take
advantage of this option. Therefore, judges cannot so easily avoid
making these determinations. This scenario presents an interesting
example for discussion of the role of the judiciary in establishing the
practical workings of doctrines they are so involved in implementing.
III. THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THE
MissouRI REMITTITUR EPISODE
The Firestone and Kenton opinions and the legislative action
that followed have received very little judicial or scholarly attention.
Neither opinion has been cited by courts outside of Missouri on
85. § 537.068 (emphasis added).
86. 693 S.W.2d at 98.
87. See Thomas, supra note 25, at 696-97.
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issues related to remittitur. Neither has received serious attention in
scholarly work, though the cases and the statute have occasionally
garnered mention in various practice manuals, treatises, and A.L.R.
entries, which note this example of a court's dissatisfaction with the
doctrine of remittitur but provide no further discussion.88 There is a
student case comment on Firestone, written shortly after the decision
was issued, but it fails to grapple with the crucial issues at stake
here.89 And, the only law review citation to Kenton that deals with
the court's abolishment of remittitur appears in an article written by
one of the Missouri Supreme Court judges who could not sit on the
pair of cases due to a personal conflict.9" More than a decade after
the decisions were issued, Judge Blackmar called the court's sua
sponte abolishment of remittitur "an unwarranted exercise of
[judicial] activism, supported by no good reason."91 This brings us to
the really interesting and important questions regarding judicial
involvement in the development of remedial jurisprudence.
This Article cannot pretend to establish any conclusive
definition of what constitutes judicial "activism." That is a very
complicated question that merits more extensive analysis than is
possible here, requiring as it does, a fully worked-out theory of the
judicial role. It is, however, at least possible to say this much: it
cannot be that we desire a judiciary that is wholly passive. It would
not matter so much who served in the judicial branch if we did not
understand that judges' personalities-their backgrounds, their skills,
and so on-matter.92  Despite the prevalence of statements about
88. See, e.g., JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN TREATISE § 22:41 (3d ed. 2008);11 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2815 (2d ed. 2008); Kristine Cordier
Karnezis, Annotation, Validity of State Statutory Caps on Punitive Damages, 103 A.L.R. FED.
379 (2002).
89. Donald K. Anton, Comment, The Missouri Aberration: Abolition of Remittitur, 30 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1195 (1986). Due to its timing, of course, after detailing the facts and reasoning of
the case and providing some history of remittitur, the comment focuses its evaluative section on
whether the holding should apply to cases currently pending. Id. at 1215-17. Even considering
its timing between the decision and the legislative response, though, it is surprising that the
comment fails to consider the additional reasoning provided by the Kenton case. In criticizing the
extreme nature of the decision, the comment gives no weight to the special perspective of the
decisionmakers on misuse of remittitur by their lower court colleagues.
90. See Charles B. Blackmar, Judicial Activism, 42 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 753, 775-76 (1998).
(The nature of the personal conflict is not evident).
91. Id. at 776.
92. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166-77
(1921). Missouri is a shining example of concern for proper selection of judges, being at the
forefront of reform in developing a nonpartisan merit selection plan, commonly known as the
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judges as umpires or judges only declaring the law,93 it would be
naYve to imagine that judges in a common law system are not called
on to make law in certain circumscribed ways.94 Thus, "activism" in
and of itself should not be considered a dirty word. In particular, it
should not be a dirty word where the subject of the "activism" has to
do with the judicial role itself, and has (as in this case) to do not with
arrogating additional authority to the role, but rather exercising
increased self-restraint due to perceived overreaching in a particular
area. The "activism" of Firestone and Kenton thus comes in an area
in which we should hope for activism-where judges consider their
roles and candidly address their concerns about the implementation
of doctrines that are judicially driven. Judges have a perspective
here and a credibility that only they can provide about the role and
the day-to-day decisionmaking of the judge.
And indeed, as one might expect, Judge Blackmar's article on
judicial activism concerns itself primarily with those instances of
"activism" that impose particular ideologies on cases regarding
matters of social policy.95 The example of Kenton, however, seems a
bit out of place in his discussion, because it appears that the reason
for Judge Blackmar's label of "activism" in this case does not arise
from the imposition of personal agendas. Rather, his use of the label
of "activism" with regard to Kenton apparently arises from the fact
that none of the parties to the cases argued for abolishing remittitur.96
Blackmar specifically notes that it was the independent idea of the
majority of the state supreme court to take this step.97
Surely this is not (or at any rate should not be) what complaints
about "judicial activism" are really concerned about. After all, the
very idea of the common law is premised upon the development of
Missouri Plan, for its state judiciary. See Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan,
http://www.courts.missouri.gov/page.asp?id=297 (last visited Jan.13, 2009), for a description of
the plan.
93. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55-56
(2005) (statement of J. John G. Roberts Jr.), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
congress/senate/judiciary/sh 109-158/browse.html.
94. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 92, at 98-141 (discussing "the [j]udge as a [l]egislator").
95. See generally Blackmar, supra note 90.
96. See id. at 775-76.
97. Id. at 775. For further discussion of the kind of "active" or "involved" judging in which
judges supply reasoning not suggested by the parties, see, for example, Sarah M.R. Cravens,
Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 251 (2004).
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legal standards through case law, so it is not unusual for a court to
issue a holding that has applicability beyond the case actually being
decided. Perhaps more importantly, judges, tasked among other
things with looking out for the integrity of the corpus of the common
law, have a different perspective and a different agenda than the
litigants. The litigants have only their own interests at stake-they
want only for this specific remittitur order to stand or fall-so there
is no reason for them to make more global arguments. It would take
a bold litigant indeed to argue that judges should eliminate an aspect
of their discretionary powers. Litigants simply cannot be expected to
have the interest or the perspective to make such an argument. If
judges, on the other hand, were only to take into account the
concerns of the parties before them and not to concern themselves
with their obligations to the law itself and the system in which they
administer justice, things could very easily get off track or develop
inconsistently and inefficiently. The system benefits from this higher
level of oversight by the highest court. This may be "activism," but
only insofar as the word is taken to mean that judges are actively
involved in performing their roles.
The court certainly did not need to use these cases as an
opportunity to make a general rule about remittitur. Thus, the charge
of judicial activism does at least present an interesting set of
questions about proper venues for general rulemaking regarding
efficient use of judicial resources. Kenton, rather than Firestone,
would arguably have been the better primary poster case for
abolishing remittitur because of the starker "judicial hairsplitting"
and the absence of any conceivable rational basis for the amount of
the remittitur. However, stepping back from the choice between
those two cases for the initial decision, it is arguably most efficient
for the court to make a change to a common law doctrine in the
common law itself-that is, in a case that illustrates the need for the
change.
The Supreme Court of Missouri does have constitutionally
authorized rulemaking authority, so if remittitur is properly
considered a rule of procedure, the authority would have been there
as well.98 Would it have been better, then, to make a rule in that
98. MO. CONST. art. V, § 5. The fact that the appeals in Firestone and Kenton were made at
least in part according to the procedure embodied in Missouri Rule of Appellate Procedure 78. 10
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venue to abolish a doctrine that had not been encompassed by those
rules previously?99 If that was in fact the case, and if the majority in
fact exhibited such unwarranted activism, why then did the
dissenting judge not write to explain? And why did Judge Blackmar
not explain as much when he labeled the case an example of judicial
activism in his law review article?' ° Judge Blackmar states that the
holding was "supported by no good reason" without offering either
any criticism of the reasons given in the opinion or any substantive
arguments of his own against the court's decision.101
Assuming that we can move past the stigma of the word
"activism," there remains the further question of whether this was
"unwarranted" activism."2 There is, of course, a large body of
scholarship on the tension between judicial and legislative
rulemaking authority.0 3 The general problem of judicial rulemaking
authority is a far larger problem than can be tackled in this brief
Article, but Firestone and Kenton reveal a specific problem within
that field that has received inadequate attention. There is particular
tension on rulemaking authority of the courts as between rules of
procedure and rules of substance."°  There is generally more
acceptance of an active role for the judiciary in developing rules of
procedure because they have to do with practical matters of
managing the cases before them.0 5 For the purposes of a discussion
(such as those in Firestone and Kenton) that is fundamentally about
demonstrates that the authority to make a relevant rule existed here. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
99. It could be argued that the substance of the court's action was within its power and that
the rulemaking mechanism would have been preferable due to the recusals in the cases that kept
two of the judges from sitting. Presumably the full complement of the court could have
contributed to a rulemaking effort. If that were the case, though, and if it were, for example,
either the basis for Judge Welliver's dissent or for Judge Blackmar's criticism, one would expect
such a straightforward objection to have been stated. One might even reasonably expect the
majority to have responded to such an objection. However, if that was in fact the basis of any
frustration with the court's action, it is nowhere expressed.
100. See Blackmar, supra note 90, at 776.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The proper resolution of this tension has long been a matter of scholarly debate. See,
e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977); Roscoe
Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REv. 28 (1952); James R.
Wolf, Inherent Rulemaking Authority of an Independent Judiciary, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507
(2002).
104. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 103.
105. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 103.
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the mechanics and standards for application to specific cases,
remittitur looks much more like a rule of procedure than one of
substance."°6
If remittitur is a rule or doctrine of procedure, and is at the same
time so fundamentally about on-the-ground practical judgment, then
the Missouri Supreme Court's determination to abolish it looks less
like an "unwarranted" arrogation of power for the judiciary. The real
issue here is not just about procedure or substantive remedies. It is
about the fundamental nature of the judge's practical involvement in
the case. Guidelines for judges need to be as clear as possible if
there is to be sufficient uniformity of application and results to assure
the judiciary, the parties, and the public that the process is legitimate.
There is a common sentiment among appellate judges that in
order to write a dissent, one's indignation must exceed one's inertia
on the matter. No reasoning is provided for Judge Welliver's lone
dissenting vote in Firestone and Kenton."7  Instead, the only
reasoning provided is that of a majority whose indignation at the
demonstrated problems with remittitur practice outstripped the
inertia that might have led it to limit its holding to mere reversal of
erroneous remittitur orders in the two cases before it. 1°
Concerns about judicial activism tend to arise out of the reality
that the law is underdetermined."°9 When judges fill the gaps, we
106. There is an argument to be made that it is a substantive rule of remedies because of its
typical practical effect of changing the amount of damages the prevailing party will receive, but
that argument about effect might be made about almost any rule of procedure. For a fuller
discussion of the debate between procedural and substantive status for remedies issues and the
role of judges and legislatures in establishing remedial rules, see, for example, Tracy A. Thomas,
Congress' Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 679-87 (2001).
For an argument that remedies are a hybrid of procedure and substance, or at any rate fall
somewhere between the two, see, for example, DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN
REMEDIES 8 (3d ed. 2002). If there is a distinction worth drawing here, remittitur belongs on the
procedural side. As an organizational matter, rules about remittitur are typically found in
procedural sections of codes and statutes, incorporated as they typically are in the procedures for
seeking and granting new trials. In Missouri, during the brief period when remittitur was
abolished, the Eighth Circuit focused on the remedy's procedural aspects. The Eighth Circuit
panel, sitting on a diversity case applying Missouri state law, particularly noted that as remittitur
is a rule of procedure, federal rules of procedure apply to the issue, and the panel need not pay
any heed to the abolishment of the doctrine in Missouri. See Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 820 F.2d 928, 936 n.l (8th Cir. 1987).
107. Firestone v. Crown Ctr. Redev. Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)
(Welliver, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, MO. REV. STAT. § 537.068 (1987); Kenton v.
Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (Welliver, J., dissenting).
108. See Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110; see also Kenton, 693 S.W.2d at 98.
109. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 92, at 14-15.
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want them, as far as possible, to be guided by law in doing so, even if
there is no definitive answer."' So, for example, we look for
analogical reasoning based on related prior case law."' Such
reasoning gives the public confidence that judges are putting their
own ideologies as far as possible to one side and looking to the
integrity of the development of the law in determining how to fill a
gap. Put another way, public confidence in the legitimacy of judicial
decisionmaking rests on an idea that even where the law is not
"determined," it is at least in some consistent way "determinable."
Surely this is no less true on matters in the area of remedies law,
which affects more than anything else the civil litigant's bottom line.
If public confidence is threatened when judges take too "active" a
role in the cases before them, it makes little sense for the legislature
to demand that they take a more active role where their leadership
suggests they cannot reliably do so.
Judges, especially those who sit on the highest courts of their
jurisdictions, are in a position to see patterns. They not only see the
patterns that develop in cases brought to them for resolution of
inconsistent results, but they also oversee discipline of lower court
judges. This puts them in a position to see patterns of where those
judges fail and where litigants or other members of the public
question the work done by lower court judges. One might argue that
lower court judges can also see patterns, and therefore ought to have
remittitur powers to make judgments more consistent. However, that
was one of the very tasks at which the Missouri Supreme Court
found the lower courts had failed. 12
Legislatures, one might argue, can see patterns as well. After
all, that ought to be one of their great advantages over courts for the
lawmaking function. They need not limit themselves to looking just
at a case brought before them with legally circumscribed and fact-
bound issues, but can instead look at an issue writ large and seek all
kinds of input from a variety of sources. The lack of guidance-the
lack of response to the concerns of the judiciary regarding the
110. See id. passim; see also, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 469 (1897).
111. See CARDOZO, supra note 92, at 19-20; see also, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical
Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993).
112. See Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110 (citing inconsistency in remittitur practice as a reason
for abolishing it).
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implementation of remittitur practice-gives the impression that the
legislature did not in this instance put that special perspective to
good use. Part of the input that the legislature should have taken into
account here, after all, is that of the judiciary. Indeed, that would be
true whenever a judicially implemented common law doctrine like
this one is concerned, whether the legislature was specifically
responding to an action by the judiciary or not. Judges know the task
of judging. That does not mean that they should always and in every
instance have absolute power to change the rules and laws that
govern their work. It does mean, however, that if legislatures insist
that judges use a particular tool, they should sufficiently respect
judicial concerns to provide the guidance that the judges say they
lack.
Perhaps Judge Blackmar's label of "unwarranted" is a reference
not to the chosen mechanism (case law versus rulemaking) for
effecting the change, but rather a reference to the extent of the
change to long-established law. One might argue that the court could
have addressed at least one of the general problems it saw without
entirely eliminating the option of remittitur. The court might, after
all, have made an attempt to provide on its own the more detailed
guidance it noted as missing. However, the majority, particularly in
the reasoning of Firestone, indicated that while there is a lack of
guidance, that is a problem intrinsic to the tool of remittitur."3 The
remittitur standard does not, according to this line of reasoning, lend
itself to sufficiently consistent use. Perhaps more importantly, the
reasoning in Kenton adds the majority's belief that the problem
would not be solved with clarity alone because lower court judges
were not trying in good faith to accomplish the proper goals for
which the doctrine had been developed."4
In addition to calling the court's holding "unwarranted"
activism, Judge Blackmar also complains that it was "supported by
no good reason.""' 5  As discussed above, in registering this
dissatisfaction, he did not provide any specific explanation of the
inadequacy of the court's stated reasons or indicate any additional
reasons weighing against the court's decision. The reasons relied
113. See id. at I10.
114. See Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
115. Blackmar, supra note 90, at 776.
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upon by the majority are worthy of serious consideration, certainly
beyond whatever consideration (if any) the legislature gave to them
in reversing the effect of the holding. Even setting aside what is
perhaps the most compelling reason-the misuse of the tool of
remittitur-there are other compelling justifications for the court's
exercise of judgment here.
On the issue of judicial economy, it is true that that goal is not
well served when remittitur orders may simply be appealed
anyway." 6 The legislature has done nothing to address that concern.
On the issue of options remaining to the lower courts in the absence
of remittitur power, it is true that the power to grant a new trial still
exists,"' and there is nothing to stop settlements occurring at a lower
amount between the original trial and the new trial. Perhaps, then,
the threat of a new trial has even more powerful force in the absence
of a remittitur option. Certainly it should be more effective at
keeping lower court judges to exercising that authority only in cases
in which the damages awarded truly are "excessive" rather than
simply "more than this judge would have awarded."
To the extent that the purpose of remittitur is to make for better
uniformity or consistency of judgments, it has apparently not
succeeded there either. And, after all, what other reasons could there
have been-what judicial motivation could have prompted this
action if not the extreme frustration the opinions express with regard
to the practical workings of remittitur? Why would the majority go
to this extreme of removing an aspect of judicial discretion if it were
not essential to do so? Even if the legislative branch is not content to
let such a decision rest with the judiciary, at a minimum, the reasons
given and the concerns expressed by the judicial branch certainly
deserve greater attention than they received in this instance.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has not attempted to resolve the question of the
proper role of the judiciary in rulemaking where remedies are
concerned. Instead, it has attempted to illuminate the important
issues at stake where that question is concerned, and has suggested
that closer attention to what the judiciary says is warranted. It has
116. See Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110.
117. Id.
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pointed out these two Missouri cases as particularly underrated
examples of such judicial contributions and the legislative reaction
they provoked as an underrated example of the tension between the
judicial and legislative branches where remedies law is concerned.
This whole remittitur episode raises important issues about the role
of the judiciary in the development of both theory and practice
governing remedial decisionmaking and therefore merits further
attention and discussion on a broader scale, both as a matter of
remedies law and as a matter of judicial ethics particular to the
remedies context.
